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Labor Unrest and Incipient Collective Bargaining in China 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we argue that both labor unrest and collective bargaining are increasing in 
China. Using McAdam’s political process theory, we argue that Chinese workers are 
striking more and offensively in support of their economic demands. We identify the 
state’s interests in promoting collective bargaining, and through an analysis of union and 
employers organizations, attempt to predict the future trajectory of collective bargaining 
in China. Using new data about strikes, we confirm our argument that strikes in China are 
increasing. Based on very limited past and current research, we create a taxonomy of 
baseline collective bargaining in China against which future developments can be 
compared. 
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As is now increasingly apparent, labor unrest in China has been rising steadily in China 
and especially since 2008. Newspapers increasingly report stories about strikes, 
especially after the strike at a Honda parts supplier in June 2010, which triggered a wave 
of similar strikes. The available evidence suggests that labor unrest is growing, and that 
the bargaining power of Chinese workers has been strengthened by positive labor market 
conditions (a labor shortage) and protective labor legislation (a series of laws 
commencing with the Labor Contract Law). Silver and Zhang (2009: 174) suggest that 
China is ‘an emerging epicenter of world labor unrest’.  
 In response, the Chinese government is encouraging the institution of collective 
bargaining. In this sense, the state’s actions are consistent with those of states elsewhere 
(although its motivations may be varied). In every major industrial society, an outbreak 
of strikes and labor unrest led to legislation establishing collective bargaining as the key 
methodology to deal with this issue, although the institutional landscape surrounding 
collective bargaining differs significantly across different countries. However, the 
Chinese approach to collective bargaining differs substantially from those in the West  in 
two significant respects, i.e., while most collective bargaining regimes in most countries 
are based on the principle of Freedom of Association, where workers can belong to 
unions of their own choosing, in China all workers have to belong to one ‘official’ union 
federation, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). And in contrast to other 
countries, there is no positive right to strike in China. Despite these crucial differences, 
however, collective bargaining appears to be growing rapidly in China. 
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 Whether collective bargaining will solve the problem of industrial conflict in 
China depends on the extent to which it is institutionalized, i.e., the extent to which three 
actors: employers, the ACFTU, and workers begin to use it effectively. The purpose of 
this paper is to attempt to predict the future of collective bargaining in China, based on 
theoretical perspectives and the limited empirical evidence we have thus far. We will 
address the following questions: Why is labor unrest in China increasing after 2008? 
Why is the Chinese state encouraging the development of collective bargaining? How is 
collective bargaining developing in China, and what might be its future trajectory? We 
draw on admittedly scant empirical evidence from our own prior and on-going research 
to answer these questions.  
Our paper suffers from several limitations, which readers should take into account 
while evaluating the paper’s conclusions. First, there is a problem with empirical 
evidence with regard to collective bargaining in China. It is a relatively recent 
development, having acquired the force of law only in 2008. There is no tradition of 
scholarship on collective bargaining within China, hence, there are very few studies. It is 
not a popular subject amongst Chinese management scholars (or China based scholars in 
general), in part because it is a politically sensitive topic. It is not taught in the premier 
Chinese business schools. Hence it is no surprise that of the hundreds of papers presented 
at the IACMR conference (the premier Chinese management conference) on 
organizations and human resource management, this paper was the only one that dealt 
with the subject of Chinese labor relations, a key human resource issue for China's 
development.  
 5 
Second, we rely on existing research on collective bargaining, which is based on 
case studies. While generalizing from case studies is fraught with problems, as Eisenhardt 
(1989) has indicated, case studies can be revealing about the processes (collective 
bargaining is a new process in China), which is what is needed to build theory and predict 
future trends. We attempt to do so via our taxonomy of collective bargaining in China, 
but we do note that it is based on limited empirical evidence.  
Third, readers must keep in mind that we are dealing with a sensitive political 
subject. The success of collective bargaining in solving industrial conflict depends 
heavily on its successful institutionalization. That, in turn, depends on the extent to which 
Chinese labor unions have the freedom to be legitimate representatives of employees. For 
them to do so, leaders of unions must be chosen by the employees, which is not the case 
currently. Yet, as we speculate in later sections of the paper, it is possible that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may find ways to increase trade union independence 
from the party in order to increase its own legitimacy. That is not the case currently. If 
anything, the CCP is tending toward greater control rather than less. Therefore, while we 
speculate in the paper with regard to the State’s interest, we do not have a basis to make 
strong predictions with regard to the states’ future policies with regard to both unions and 
collective bargaining. 
   
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Worker Militancy 
The first key question raised in this paper is with regard to why labor conflict, measured 
in terms of the number of strikes, is increasing in China since 2008. Prior research has 
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suggested that strikes are limited in number (although estimates vary), and there is 
variation in worker militancy based on the nature of workers (whether migrants or SOE), 
regional differences, ownership differences, and the degree of state suppression of strikes. 
The literature also suggests that most strikes are ‘defensive’ in nature, trying to protect 
existing rights and benefits (see Lee, 2007; Lüthje, 2012; Pan 2009; Weston, 2004). In 
this paper, we argue that strikes today are very different. In our current and ongoing work 
we rely on McAdam’s (1999) ‘political process’ model (see Figure 1) to explain the 
rising militancy of Chinese workers. For McAdam’s framework to be applicable to the 
Chinese labor context, we would expect certain factors to be present. First, economic and 
political factors that influence workers’ bargaining power should exist. And second, 
workers should experience ‘cognitive cues’.  
 
          INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The key economic condition is that since early 2009, China has developed a labor 
shortage on its coasts and, increasingly, elsewhere (see, for example, Rapoza, 2011). 
Gallagher (2011) links the increase in labor militancy and bargaining power to the 
shortage of workers, and argues that these shortages are a function of three issues: the 
decline in the working population as a consequence of the one child policy, policy 
changes in agriculture (sharp cuts to the taxes paid by farmers and stimulus-driven 
increases in rural infrastructure) that are raising the ‘opportunity costs’ of working on the 
coast and reducing migration to the cities, thus depriving them of workers, and finally, 
institutional discrimination against migrants as a result of the hukou system. Clearly, rural 
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workers are increasingly staying at home. A poll of 200,000 migrant workers in 2011 
found that more chose to work in their home provinces than chose to go elsewhere (Wang, 
2012). Capital is moving away from southeastern export processing zones like the Pearl 
River Delta. Chongqing, for instance, ‘for the first time employed more of its surplus 
rural workforce locally than it sent to other areas’ in 2011 (The Economist, 2012). 
Whether permanent or temporary, the shortage has served to increase labor militancy and 
bargaining power, reflected particularly in increasing demands for wages.  
 The key political factor has been the state’s policy regarding worker protection 
and collective bargaining as well as the new media openness (at least until 2013) which 
serve to further increase the bargaining power of workers, In 2008, the state embarked on 
a ‘legislative onslaught’ enacting a range of pro-labor pieces of legislation, including the 
‘Labor Contract Law’, ‘Employment Promotion Law’, and the ‘Labor Dispute Mediation 
and Arbitration Law’. And in 2012 new national ‘Regulations on Consultation and 
Mediation for Labor Disputes in Enterprises’ went into effect. These reforms essentially 
introduced stronger protections for workers (Friedman & Lee, 2010; McDermott, 2010). 
Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014: 460 note that these laws, taken together, ‘amount to an 
official acknowledgment of the massive scale of worker unrest, as well as a new interest 
in containing conflict through providing it with legitimate channels, not attempting to 
eliminate it entirely’. Thus, it could be argued that China's ‘political opportunity structure’ 
for workers (Tarrow, 1998) has also shifted.  
 In terms of ‘cognitive cues’, workers experienced these changes in many different 
ways. As Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014:460) note, ‘Companies’ efforts to “reverse-
market” themselves as “preferred employers”, by actively recruiting in working class 
Comment [ED1]: AU: Please confirm 
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neighborhoods (rather than waiting for workers to line up at factory doors, desperate for 
work), by building better dormitories, by publishing factory magazines, and by forming 
“task forces” of employee representatives may be received by working people as 
powerful “cues” that the balance of power has shifted and that they (workers) hold 
greater leverage over capital than a decade ago’ . Rising earnings may send similar 
signals. Wage hikes in recent years have been dramatic. Migrants’ average monthly 
salaries increased by 21.2 percent in 2011 over the year before; the government has 
decreed that ‘the average growth of China's minimum wages should be at least 13 percent’ 
through 2015 and should constitute ‘40 percent of average local salaries’ (The China Post, 
2012). A series of strikes at auto parts suppliers and a rash of suicides (and, subsequently, 
investigative reports) in a Foxconn factory in Shenzhen have led to high wage increases 
exceeding 20% at Honda plants. Equally importantly, media coverage of new labor laws 
like those noted above and greater reporting on strikes may provide ‘cues’ that more 
activism is tolerated by authorities. The Labor Contract Law was the subject of 
widespread domestic media reports focusing on individual cases of workers who 
successfully used the law ‘as a weapon’. Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) note that by 
telling ‘gritty’ stories of mistreatment and eventual redemption via arbitration and court, 
Chinese state newspapers both attract readers (serving the needs of an increasingly 
commercialized press) and, according to surveys conducted by Stockmann and Gallagher, 
increase trust in the efficacy of legal activism.  
 Importantly, the state has allowed more open discussion of industrial strife. The 
year 2008 marked the rollout of what has been dubbed China’s ‘Control 2.0’ approach to 
media and public opinion: Communist Party Secretary Hu Jintao called for ‘releasing 
Comment [ED2]: AU: Is this the correct 
end of this quote? 
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authoritative information at the earliest moment, raising timeliness, increasing 
transparency, and firmly grasping the initiative in news propaganda work’ (Bandurski, 
2008:1). However, strikes and other worker ‘mass incidents’ have since received 
increased coverage, albeit with a Party-approved slant. This has meant that workers hear 
more about other workers’ activism than ever before. As Elfstrom and Kuruvilla’s (2014) 
qualitative interviews suggest, ‘The Honda strike, in particular, gave workers a new 
momentum. It awakened them’, and ‘The Honda strike had a big impact on workers' 
opinions, because of the media attention given to the strike. Similar strikes occurred in 
the past, but without the same attention’.  
 We would therefore expect ‘cognitive liberation’ to take place: workers should 
demand higher wages, more attention to the details of working life, and would strike if 
their demands are not met. We would expect both quantitative shift in terms of an 
increasing number of strikes, and we would expect pro-active strikes, for a variety of 
instrumental reasons. We would expect more strikes in all regions of China, in contrast to 
regional differences identified in prior research.  
 
State Promotion of Collective Bargaining 
The Chinese government has, since 2008, embarked on a coordinated effort to increase 
collective bargaining. It has done so via three separate initiatives: a change in the role of 
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), the inclusion of 
provisions for collective contract negotiations in the new labor laws of the 2007–2010 
period (discussed above)
 [1]
 and, most importantly, the instructions of the ACFTU to 
increase union organizing and collective bargaining coverage across the country. The 
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primary change in the role of the MOHRSS has been to make it more responsible for the 
growth of collective bargaining. The Labor Contract Law contains six articles about 
collective contracts, stipulating the content of collective bargaining and the right to ratify 
a collective bargaining agreement of the workers’ congress. And two articles focus 
specifically on the establishment of relatively centralized – regional and industry level – 
bargaining. Finally, the state and the ACFTU articulated the ‘Rainbow Plan’ (2008) to 
introduce collective bargaining in enterprises. Specific targets were established, i.e., 
collective contracts should be generally established in enterprises above a designated 
size,
[2]
 in East China by 2009, in Central China by the end of 2010, and in the whole 
country by the end of 2012. Meanwhile, they continued to encourage (without specific 
targets) industry-wide or regional agreements to cover those nonunionized or small to 
medium-sized enterprises (Hu, 2011). What explains the state’s interests in doing so?  
We do not yet have a coherent theory of the Chinese state’s interests. In fact, a 
variety of concepts can be found in the literature to characterize the Chinese state and 
will not be repeated here (see Howell, 2006 for a comprehensive review). Howell (2006: 
274) suggests that the proliferation of terms to describe the Chinese state (development 
state, entrepreneurial state, the corporatist state, the dual developmental state, the market 
facilitating state) by authors such as Blecher (1991), Blecher and Shue (1996), and Oi 
(1995) masks a ‘deeper process of state fragmentation that fosters contradictory and 
complex patterns of state behavior’. Howell (2006: 275) suggests that to understand the 
Chinese state today, we must recognize that the state lies between various categories, 
displaying ‘elements of efficiency and inefficiency, of control and chaos, of relative 
autonomy and clientelism, of neoliberalism and neocorporatism’. This conception of the 
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Chinese state allows it to be best understood as ‘polymorphous, assuming multiple 
complex forms and behaviours across time and space’ (Howell 2006:276 and provides us 
with a better understanding of state interests in developing collective bargaining.  
 One explanation for the state’s action to increase collective bargaining draws 
primarily on the basic and long established institutional theory about industrial conflict 
and collective bargaining developed by the Webbs in their influential work ‘Industrial 
Democracy’ (1897). The Webbs’ solution to labor conflict (consisting of ‘the device of 
the common rule’ [basic minimum standards legislation] on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, collective bargaining to equalize power between labor and management) has 
been the basis for most approaches states the world over have taken to reduce industrial 
conflict, under what Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002) term ‘a logic of labor peace’. The 
Chinese government’s response in encouraging collective bargaining is in many ways 
consistent with this explanation, in that it has enacted minimum standards legislation and 
is increasing collective bargaining coverage, but it is doing so in ways that do not result 
in the formation of free labor unions, i.e., the state here is corporatist and neoliberal at the 
same time.  
An alternative perspective is that the state’s labor policy is based on 
‘decentralized legal authoritarianism’ (Friedman & Lee, 2010), which suggests a great 
emphasis on legal system building (Gallagher, 2005) in order to steer the reform of the 
social governance system in general, and labor relations system in particular, towards an 
authoritarian ‘rule by law’ system (Friedman & Lee, 2010). This explains the many 
legislations increasing labor protection during the 2007–2010 period, with the result that 
OECD has ranked the strictness of employment protection in Chinese labor and 
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employment laws as among the highest in major countries ( OECD, 2013; Venn, 2009). 
This also explains why the state has encouraged legal mobilization and seeks to channel 
labor conflict into the judicial and semi-judicial system (Gallagher & Dong, 2011; Lee, 
2007), in part to maintain political control. Given that labor peace (i.e., no strikes) can be 
achieved by strong protective legislation on minimum standards, as well as effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the state’s encouragement of collective bargaining (an 
essentially democratic concept which implies some amount of independent agency on the 
part of workers), which might result in collective activity that might threaten the regime, 
remains puzzling.  
Yet another explanation for the state’s encouragement of collective bargaining 
can be found in the conception of the ‘developmental’ state. As Friedman and Kuruvilla 
(2015) note, at the firm level, high rates of labor turnover and severe labor shortages have 
come to be one of the key limits to future growth. The inability to retain a stable 
workforce has pushed employers in the industrial centers in coastal areas to look 
elsewhere. Cai (2007) has suggested that China may be at the ‘Lewisian turning point’, 
when labor scarcity begins to shift the economy away from labor intensive, input-driven 
growth to enhanced productivity, declining inequality, and greater domestic consumption. 
On the other hand, Chan (2010) argues that the country has not yet reached a Lewisian 
turning point but is instead experiencing a series of shorter-term mismatches of ages, 
skills and demand. However, at the national level, the state has espoused the goal of 
‘economic rebalancing’, making household consumption rather than state-driven 
investment the key engine for economic growth, an important consideration to avoid the 
‘middle income trap’ that the World Bank has predicted that China will reach in 2030. In 
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2010, China’s household consumption as a share of GDP was only 38%, while similar 
figures for Brazil, Germany, India, and the USA are higher than 60%.  
The state has already acted. At the 2013 plenum, the CCP outlined a plan to 
increase the role of markets in resource allocation by 2018, along with a range of policies 
that loosen various institutional interdependencies, granting more autonomy to local 
governments, but at the same time making the judiciary less dependent on local 
governments. Economic rebalancing calls for industrial policies that stimulate domestic 
demands and strengthen citizens’ purchasing power, and market-oriented institutions to 
have wages increased in tandem with industrial and economic growth. Wage growth is 
particularly important, and here we find an alternative explanation for the state’s 
encouragement of collective bargaining. The CCP’s 17th National Congress (2007) laid 
out the general target of establishing mechanisms for regular wage increases in 
enterprises. First in 2008 and then again in 2014 collective bargaining was written into 
the central government’s work report to the People’s Congress, where the government 
announced the establishment of mechanisms for regular wage increases in enterprises =to 
deepen the reform of the income distribution system. Encouraging the ACFTU to 
establish collective bargaining in every establishment can be seen as one way to satisfy 
the state’s interest to increase wages and move the economy into higher value added 
productivity based growth.  
A different basis for the state’s promotion of collective bargaining lies in its role 
as a regulator, enacting policies consistent with the vision of a ‘harmonious’ society, an 
overarching concept adopted by the CCP during the Hu Jin Tao regime. The state has a 
keen interest under this conception in limiting the growth in inequality. In the 30 years 
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since economic reform began, China has gone from being the world’s most equal large 
economy, with a gini coefficient of approximately 0.26 in 1979, to amongst the most 
unequal large economies (with a gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2012). The widening income 
inequality is seen as a potential threat to political stability (a gini coefficient of 0.40 is 
seen as the ‘security line’). Again, a variety of actions in the labor arena can be seen as 
inequality reduction mechanisms, notably the plethora of laws that promote equal pay 
and move workers from the informal sphere to the formal sphere. Collective bargaining, 
and especially industry wide collective bargaining is one way to standardize wages and 
benefits within industries. 
  
Variations in Collective Bargaining 
Although the central state promotes collective bargaining using uniform mechanisms at 
the national level, there is significant variation in the development of collective 
bargaining mechanisms, rules, and in institutionalization across China. What might 
explain this variation? In most countries, variations in collective bargaining processes can 
be linked to differences in bargaining structure (which in turn depends on the structure of 
unions and employers), as well as different regulations across states or regions (see Katz 
& Darbishire, 2002). The state in China through its Labor Contract Law has promoted 
some variation, in that it supports both collective bargaining at the firm level, as well as 
collective bargaining at the industry level (articles 53 and 54). Friedman and Kuruvilla 
(2015) argue that China is taking an experimental, gradualist, and decentralized approach 
to the introduction of collective bargaining and to labor relations reform. They suggest 
that there are a number of ways in which the central state promotes or allows local 
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experimentation. One the one hand, the ACFTU has consciously undermined the power 
of the nationally organized industrial unions in favor of regionally based federations, to 
prevent them from developing potentially an independent base of political power. Hence, 
much of the experimentation we see is at the enterprise level. But we must remember that 
provincial and local governments also have interests. And local governments play a 
major role in promoting collective negotiations. For instance, Friedman and Kuruvilla 
(2015) note that the Binhai new district in Tianjin provides firms with a subsidy equal to 
15% of the total increase in wage bill that comes about through collective bargaining. 
Clearly, the local government has interests in raising wages and wants to incentivize 
firms to use collective bargaining regularly. Other local governments encourage 
collective bargaining because it may prevent strikes and the general instability that ensues 
as a result of public protests. Several provinces have enacted detailed regulations that go 
above and beyond the national regulations with regard to collective bargaining. Recently, 
Guangdong province enacted bargaining regulations, taking effect in January 2015, 
which not only provide for employer obligation to bargain, but even more far reaching, 
allow the direct election of worker representatives by workers. The point here is that we 
would expect to see considerable variation in collective bargaining based on the interests 
of different provincial and municipal governments. But these variations are tolerated, and 
in fact, encouraged by the central state, and as argued by Friedman and Kuruvilla (2015), 
consistent with the state’s approaches in other arenas. For instance, the state has allowed 
a variety of experimentations with market reform to develop in the provinces, which has 
resulted in experiments with decollectivization of land (Unger, 2002). If regions proved 
successful, their models could be promoted throughout the country. We argue that the 
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state is taking a similar approach with regard to collective bargaining. In part, given the 
differences in employment structure, ownership, industry, workforce composition, across 
regions, provinces, and cities, a differentiated approach is necessary. However, the state’s 
tolerance of diversity coexists with a key requirement, that independent forms of worker 
organization are banned.  
In sum, we suggest that the central and local states promote collective bargaining 
for a variety of different interests, and that we should expect to see a variation in 
collective bargaining arrangements across different provinces and regions. Hence, 
Howell’s conception of the Chinese state as a polymorphous one is best suited to the 
analysis of its motivations for promoting collective bargaining. In order to predict the 
future direction of collective bargaining, we then turn to an analysis of Chinese unions 
and employers.  
 
The Future of Collective Bargaining 
As noted earlier, the future of collective bargaining depends heavily on the degree to 
which it is institutionalized, which in turn depends on the ability and willingness of 
employers and trade unions to adopt the process. At the moment, we argue that it is at an 
incipient stage. The state has established the basic framework via its Tripartite 
Conference on the Coordination of Labor Relations (xietiao laodong guanxi sanfang 
huiyi), involving the labor ministry, the ACFTU, and the China Enterprise Confederation-
China Enterprise Directors’ Association (CEC-CEDA) – a semi-official employer 
association in China in 2001 (Brown, 2006). The tripartite system was strengthened in 
February 2005, when the ‘Circular on Further Advancing the Collective Wage 
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Negotiation’ was published by the three parties, requiring all branches of the three parties 
at different levels to collaboratively work together to increase collective bargaining. The 
state’s ‘legislative onslaught’ in 2007/8 for the first time created a legal basis for 
collective bargaining. And finally, the state has instructed the ACFTU to organize 
workplaces and establish collective bargaining in all workplaces, articulated now through 
the ‘rainbow’ plan.  
Since the primary engine for collective bargaining growth apparently rests on the 
ACFTU, it is useful to theoretically examine its evolution. The key question here is 
whether the ACFTU can effectively represent Chinese workers in collective negotiations. 
There are two primary lines of debate and argument with regard to the role of the 
ACFTU. The first concerns the ACFTU’s identity, whether it is functioning in largely 
path dependent ways and has not yet made the transition to a new role in a market based 
society. The second is that the ACFTU suffers from a crisis of legitimacy, in that most 
workers do not trust the union or see it as effective. We discuss each in turn below.  
With regard to whether the role of the ACFTU has transformed, Chen has argued 
that the ACFTU remains stuck to its ‘double institutional’ identity as both an apparatus of 
the state (acting on behalf of the nation’s collective good) and as a labor organization to 
protect workers interests (Chen, 2003). In the old system, Chen argues that the ACFTU 
did not quite experience tensions between its two roles, largely because its representation 
function was ‘actually absorbed by the state’, given that its paternalistic labor regime 
under the ‘iron rice bowl’ system of employment guaranteed workers economic interests 
such as work, pay, health care, and social security. But under a market based system, it is 
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increasingly experiencing these tensions, especially as industrial disputes and worker 
militancy increase.  
Yet, the extent to which the ACFTU has evolved in a more representative 
direction remains contested. Chan (Chan, 1993; Unger & Chan, 1995) argues that the 
ACFTU played an effective corporatist role in the socialist period, but is likely to 
continue this in the market era, because the state’s needs to effectively bridge the gap 
between the grassroots and the state in the market economy has created space for the 
ACFTU, among other such organizations, to incorporate worker voice into the 
bureaucratic system of the state. Chan (1993) predicted that the ACFTU would transform 
from its state corporatist role to that of a more societal corporatist role that features ‘a 
coalescing of horizontal interests from the bottom upward’.  
However, Friedman (2014a) does not see a promising corporatist future for the 
ACFTU for three reasons. First, corporatism requires that workers’ voices are 
successfully incorporated into the system, while the ACFTU does not incorporate 
workers voices. Second, corporatism requires that workers give up political demands in 
exchange for economic benefits and therefore implies a relatively de-commodified model 
of social governance, whereas in China workers clearly do not enjoy, sufficiently, such 
benefits. Third, however co-opted a union under corporatism is, it is a somewhat 
independent intermediary organization between the grassroots and the state, while the 
ACFTU, is clearly part of the state apparatus with no such independence.  
That being said, clearly there is some transition to a more representative role of 
the ACFTU. Chen (2003) documents the increasing ways in which unions are taking up 
their representative function with regard to individual, if not collective, disputes. The 
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ACFTU has carried out reforms and ‘experiments’ at both central and local levels. In the 
arena of organizing, unions at all levels have developed various models (i.e., the 
traditional ACFTU pattern, the union association patter, and the regional, industry-based 
pattern) to strategically organize workers (Liu, 2010). Nevertheless, the ability of the 
unions to effectively represent workers is limited on the one hand by their subjective 
position with regard to the employer, and on the other because union leadership cadres 
see union organizing as a bureaucratic exercise to meet the targets suggested by the state, 
rather than a strategic one (Liu, 2010; Taylor & Li, 2010).  
Chen (2003) suggests that there is a natural limit to the ACFTU’s ability to be an 
independent representative agent, i.e., the state will not loosen its control over the unions, 
because of ‘solidarity phobia’ (e.g., the Polish experience) whereby more independent 
unionism is seen as subversive and threatening to the regime, as well as being threatening 
to the role of the state as a ‘developmental’ state. Therefore, we expect that the state will 
continue protecting the ACFTU monopoly on worker representation – a condition that 
Friedman (2014a) called ‘appropriated representation’, whereby the ACFTU may be able 
to promote collective bargaining using its unique political position at the national level, 
whereas workplace unions will remain weak and illegitimate.  
 The crisis of legitimacy of the ACFTU has been well documented by several 
authors (Howell, 2008; Taylor & Li, 2007). The key argument here is that Chinese 
workers do not trust the ACFTU to adequately represent them, and in fact in many 
workplaces where the ACFTU is present, the workers do not even know that they have 
representation. The ACFTU is seen as largely apathetic, willing to allow management to 
exercise control (this explains the phenomena of ‘dual posting’ where the company’s 
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human resource manager is allowed by the ACFTU officials to act as ‘union leader’). 
Friedman (2014a) suggests that official unions have been unable to win recognition from 
workers, and therefore wildcat strikes and other forms of representation continue to be 
the most effective means of addressing worker grievances. There have been recent 
experiments regarding direct union elections, which would arguably lead to more 
representative unions, and hence more legitimate ones, but there is a lack of sufficient 
worker involvement in these experiments (Chan, 2009; Howell, 2008), with a notable 
exception of elections initiated by workers via spontaneous strikes (Hui & Chan, 2014).  
Given that unions have an identity crisis as well as a crisis of legitimacy, the key 
hypotheses that we can advance is that unions will be unable to effectively represent 
workers in collective bargaining, and are more likely to see collective bargaining as a 
bureaucratic exercise, just as they view union organizing. Collective agreements then are 
more likely to be formalistic exercises that primarily re-state the basic conditions under 
the laws, and less likely to advance workers’ interests.  
Like the ACFTU, the two national employer associations – the CEC-CEDA and 
the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) – participate in the 
tripartite framework to promote collective bargaining, but both are also subordinated to 
the CCP. Our current ongoing research suggests that these employer associations are 
half-hearted partners in promoting collective bargaining. Local employer associations, 
although theoretically have to be affiliated with the two big national associations, often 
enjoy more autonomy from the state as well as their upper levels in decision making than 
their equivalents on the union side do (Friedman, 2014b). This allows them to ignore 
collective bargaining, or when it suits their interests to encourage and promote it. Given 
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tight labor market conditions, it often suits local employers to engage in some form of 
regional or industry-wide coordination on wages and working conditions. In such cases, 
local employer associations serve as mechanisms of employers’ collective voice, while 
lead firms are indeed key players. But apart from these industry-wide bargaining 
scenarios employers tend to shy away from collective bargaining at the firm level, except 
after strikes.  
Given the union’s identity and legitimacy crises, and the employers’ relative lack 
of interest in promoting collective bargaining at the firm level, we have no basis to expect 
that the institution of collective bargaining will fulfill the state’s objectives in introducing 
it as a means of containing labor conflict. In what follows, we discuss our methodology, 
and in our results section, we attempt to categorize the variation that we see in collective 
bargaining (based on very limited research) in China. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In the absence of official data, we rely on alternative estimates of strikes, of which two 
sources are available. The first is a website run by the China Labour Bulletin, a Hong 
Kong based NGO that collects information on worker protests and strikes, largely from 
news reports in Chinese newspapers, but also from dissident blog sites and through the 
organization’s radio call in show. The second is a website called China Strikes (Elfstrom 
& Kuruvilla, 2014), which also uses newspaper reports, but also individual ‘tip-offs’ 
through their website. While China Strikes has focused on the period of 2008–2012, the 
China Labour Bulletin reports strikes from 2011 onwards. For the overlapping years, i.e., 
2011–2012, both websites have identified similar numbers of strikes. However, both 
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sources of data have shortcomings. First, it is possible that both websites under-report the 
actual number of incidences of worker protests and strikes, since there are many 
incidences that do not find their way into newspapers, for a variety of reasons. Second, it 
is possible that only bigger strikes that disrupt life outside the factory gates (such as taxi 
strikes) get reported in the press. And finally, the criticism that these two websites may 
be measuring news stories rather than real strikes is also not entirely without substance. 
However, in the absence of official statistics, these are the only sources of data, even if 
they understate, by a significant margin, the real numbers.  
 With regard to collective bargaining, our goal is to use the limited research 
already published, and our own observations (we are currently engaged in a research 
project on collective bargaining that is not yet complete), to create a taxonomy of 
collective bargaining in China. Given that collective bargaining is a relatively new 
institution, but one that is expected to grow in the coming years, establishing a taxonomy 
today will be useful as a baseline against which future studies can make comparisons. 
Our taxonomy uses two concepts to classify current collective bargaining. These are the 
degree of centralization (or decentralization) and the degree of authenticity of collective 
bargaining.  
 Whether bargaining is centralized or decentralized depends on the bargaining 
structure, i.e., the level at which bargaining takes place and the employees and employers 
it covers (Katz, Kochan, & Colvin, 2014). In Western European countries, a centralized 
(or multi-employer) bargaining structure is instituted at levels beyond individual firms, 
usually at the industry or national level, where negotiations are carried out by national or 
industrial level organizations of unions and employers. National level agreements are 
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common in Austria and Sweden, whereas industry level agreements are common in 
Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium. Decentralized bargaining (where agreements are 
negotiated by company level unions and their employers are more common in the US and 
Japan. In China, the labor contract law permits both centralized and decentralized 
bargaining, although the centralized bargaining it envisages is actually at a more 
decentralized level than in other countries. Specifically, the law limits regional or 
industry level collective contracts in construction, mining, restaurant, and other industries 
to areas below the county level.
[3] 
The state’s rationale for this limitation is twofold, i.e. 
the need to resolve issues of employment instability, labor shortages, strikes, high 
turnover, low social security coverage, at the county level, while at the same time 
providing an institutional structure to extend collective bargaining coverage to workers in 
these difficult to organize industries – mostly small, short-lived, and non-unionized 
businesses. In practice, local unions often are reluctant to establish collective bargaining 
at above-county levels, and regional authorities do not encourage this either, while the 
state actively discourages industry wide bargaining structures above the country level. 
Thus, we will expect to see more collective bargaining agreements at the firm level rather 
than industry level.  
 Collective bargaining can also vary based on the degree to which bargaining is 
authentic. As we have noted earlier, there is a clear tendency towards what are called 
‘template agreements’ where management and union sign a formalistic agreement that 
simply re-states the minimum conditions of the law and where workers are not even 
aware of these agreements. These would be inauthentic agreements. We define a 
collective bargaining agreement as authentic if it meets the following conditions: whether 
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unions and employers actually engage in a process of negotiations, whether workers have 
input into crafting the demands that the union negotiates on their behalf, whether those 
negotiations result in concrete outcomes, and whether the process is repeated more than 
once (a sign of institutionalization). As we will show, the majority of collective 
bargaining agreements tend to be inauthentic. Authentic agreements are relatively few, 
and typically they occur after a strike since the strike by workers needs to be settled and it 
can only be settled by negotiations.  
 Based on our theoretical discussion with regard to strikes, we would expect to see 
steadily increasing numbers of strikes, offensive in nature, all across the country, along 
with steadily increasing conflict rates. Based on our analysis of the central and local 
states’ multiple interests, we would expect to see steady growth in the number of 
collective bargaining agreements since 2008, and significant variation. Finally, based on 
our analysis of the ACFTU and employers’ associations, we would expect to see many 




China Strikes reports a total of 793 strikes during the 2008–2012 period, while the China 
Labour Bulletin indicates a total of 1867 strikes between Jan 2011 and August 2014. 
Table 1 shows counts of strikes after integrating estimates from both websites. What is 
notable is that the average frequency of strikes per month has been increasing steadily. 
Figure 2 graphs this trend.
[4]
 Chinese workers appear to be striking more, and longer, 
indicative of their bargaining power.  
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          INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
If one assumes, as we argued, that the Chinese data represents a massive 
undercount of reality, then clearly, China is the ‘strike capital’ of the world, with more 
strikes per year than most other countries. An alternative way of examining whether there 
is conflict in the system is to look at the number of labor disputes in China. As the data in 
Table 2 suggests, the number of labor disputes in China has also increased over the last 
few years.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 In sum, and despite problems with the available data, our research suggests that 
Chinese workers are increasingly militant, and that the number of strikes in China seems 




The published data show considerable growth in collective bargaining in China from 
2006 onward. As is apparent from Table 3, the annual growth rates in the number of 
collective contracts are high, nearly 20% per year. The number of enterprises being 
covered by the contracts has been growing by almost 100% per year, indicating a great 
expansion of multi-employer – industrial and regional – contracts as well. Clearly 
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therefore, the state’s encouragement of collective bargaining has been successful in 
quantitative terms. Yet the growth in collective bargaining does not show an appreciable 
decline in industrial conflict measured by strikes or data on industrial disputes. At a 
preliminary level, this suggests that the state’s encouragement of collective bargaining as 
a method of reducing conflict and strikes is not successful, or to be conservative, not 
successful yet. At the same time, data on wages show steady growth (see Table 4). We 
can draw two different conclusions from this limited data. One is that the key interest of 
the state was not to reduce conflict via the introduction of collective bargaining, but to 
increase and stabilize wages. If this conception of the state’s interest is correct, then it 
provides support for the argument that the state is acting in ‘developmental’ ways in 
encouraging collective bargaining as an instrument to rebalance the economy. An 
alternative explanation is that the state does want to introduce collective bargaining in 
order to reduce conflict (as has been done in most parts of the world), but the quality of 
collective bargaining is not very good, and hence does not meet that goal. If this is true, 
then the policy prescriptions are clearer. Below, we look more closely at the nature of 
collective bargaining.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Emerging Variation: Varieties of Collective Bargaining in China   
Based on the limited available research, we classify collective bargaining agreements 
based on how centralized or decentralized and how authentic or inauthentic they are. 
Recall our key caveat that there is relatively little published research, and hence, our 
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taxonomy below is not based on a representative sample, as it should be. However, we 
want to highlight that this is by no means a static classification, because we also see 
dynamism, where there is movement from one quadrant to another. At best this taxonomy 
should be seen as an initial estimate or baseline, against which future research can 
examine progress over the coming decade.  
  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Quadrant 1: Decentralized inauthentic collective bargaining. Perhaps the most common 
form of collective bargaining is what we term ‘template bargaining’ and what other 
researchers have described as ‘collective contracts without collective bargaining’ or 
‘paper contracts’ (Chen, 2007; Clarke et al., 2004;  Luo, 2011). Typically, the local 
government – often the labor administration and official union – develop a template for a 
collective contract that employers and the local branch of the union should sign (jiti 
hetong fanben). In some cases, the template agreement contains blank spaces for wage 
increases, which enterprises can customize to suit their needs. Usually, a template 
agreement leaves little room for the parties to bargain over interest-based issues (Chen, 
2007). This is the model of collective bargaining most commonly followed by the 
ACFTU, which provides its unions with these template agreements for various regions 
that employers are requested to sign, and which re-state minimum legal conditions. Often, 
employers prepare the contracts and unions simply sign them without engaging in any 
negotiation (Clarke et al., 2004; Luo, 2011; Taylor, Chang, & Li, 2003; Wu, 2012). 
 28 
The ACFTU, which is targeted with increasing the coverage of collective 
bargaining within the country, appears more interested in the quantity of agreements 
signed (to meet its targets) with relatively little focus on the quality (Wu, 2012). Some of 
these template agreements are not even enforced, due to weaknesses in the labor 
inspection regime (Wu, 2012), or because the local enterprise unions also exist primarily 
‘on paper’, having been set up by the ACFTU in collaboration with the employer, often 
without the workers’ knowledge (Liu, 2010). Thus, though a large majority of Chinese 
collective bargaining agreements hew to this type, we see them as being largely 
inauthentic and the most decentralized, given that they are signed at the enterprise level. 
These have been well documented in existing studies (Clarke et al., 2004; Luo, 2011; 
Taylor et al., 2003; Warner & Ng, 1999), so we shall not expand on them here.   
 
Quadrant 2: Decentralized authentic collective bargaining. A small but growing number 
of collective bargaining agreements at the firm level can be termed more authentic, 
although there is some variation to the extent that they truly encapsulate genuine 
bargaining. There are three different ways in which this type of collective bargaining is 
happening. One and perhaps the most authentic form of collective bargaining is the 
negotiations that take place after a strike as Elfstrom & Kuruvilla (2014) suggest. The 
best known case of strike-triggered bargaining is the Honda Nanhai Transmission plant’s 
strike in 2010 that resulted in substantial wage increases for workers, and later also 
triggered a strike wave in the local and national auto industry, leading to substantial wage 
negotiation in many of those cases as well (Hui, 2011). Since a strike, when it occurs, is 
frequently settled by negotiations these days (Chang, 2013), the steady growth in the 
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number of strikes implies growth in more authentic collective bargaining. There is 
increasing research that suggest that strikes before and during the 2010 strike wave were 
settled via negotiations between provisionally elected workers’ representatives and 
employers (Chen, 2010; Meng, 2012; Meng, Lu, Lei, Wang, & Chang, 2011). Some of 
these strike-based settlements have been often facilitated by the mediation of local 
governments and official unions, and the state, in various places, has appeared to prefer 
using this approach rather than suppressing striking workers (Chang, 2013; Gallagher, 
2014). Chen (2010) refers to these dispute and strike settlement mechanisms as 
quadripartite bargaining, involving four actors (the state, the ACFTU, the employers, and 
the workers). Strikes and post-strike settlements are an important route by which 
collective bargaining is becoming institutionalized, suggests Meng (2012) in his research 
on Dalian.  
The second way that authentic bargaining may occur without collective action by 
workers is through the direct intervention by the local government. Chan and Hui’s (2014) 
research on Honda’s (Guangzhou) 2011 bargaining round suggests that although a union 
in which workers elected their representatives, and collective bargaining, were 
institutionalized in the firm after the 2010 strike, the local government directly intervened 
in the negotiations during the 2011 bargaining round, and encouraged the parties to come 
to agreement. Arguably, the local government was interested in avoiding a potential 
strike. We refer to this as authentic because it is occurring in a situation where workers 
choose their own representatives, and the local government apparently takes the process 
seriously. However, this is a more isolated case. 
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 Although much of the prior literature has focused on formal bargaining structures 
to make the claim that much of Chinese collective bargaining is inauthentic, Zhang (2014) 
makes a compelling case that we should examine informal processes, which are perhaps 
just as important as formal structures, and constitute the third way in which bargaining is 
effective. He finds, in his study of the auto industry in Tianjin, that while formal 
bargaining looks just as formalistic as many other cases, much of the real negotiation 
takes place at both enterprise and industry levels, through informal processes of 
coordination and negotiations that have resulted in meaningful outcomes. Although there 
have not been strikes or government intervention in the auto-industry bargaining cases in 
Tianjin that Zhang examines, his research points to the active role of the firm union in 
ensuring substantial negotiation. Thus, there are many different ways in which authentic 
bargaining is carried out.  
 
Quadrant 3: Centralized and inauthentic collective bargaining. A major strategy of the 
ACFTU’s Rainbow Plan can be found in its effort to carry out regional and industry-level 
bargaining, seen as necessary to bring employees of small and medium sized firms under 
collective bargaining coverage (Wu, 2012). And as noted, the ACFTU’s efforts are 
complemented by the state apparatus, where key state departments often take the lead in 
mobilizing employers. For instance, in the second author's ongoing research, he finds that, 
in the case of hospitals in Tianjin, the district union successfully mobilized the employers 
by leveraging the district Bureau of Public Health (BOPH) – a state institution in charge 
of examining, approving, and supervising all local public health affairs – to create an 
industry wide collective bargaining agreement. However, it was not clear that workers 
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were aware of the agreement, nor was it clear that the agreement was enforced. Similar 
efforts are also identified in Tianjin’s construction industry, as well as in other regions in 
Wu’s (2012) research.  
 While we need more cases to draw firmer conclusions, thus far, what is clear is 
that many of these industry-wide agreements are either formalistic or have shown 
themselves to be ineffective and not institutionalized. Similar to that of decentralized and 
formalistic bargaining, the reasons for ineffectiveness at this level include the union’s 
focus on formalistic terms, the absence of strict enforcement, and often, worker ignorance 
of the terms of the agreement, or that they were represented by a union (a frequent issue 
when union representatives are not directly elected) (Wu, 2012). A classic example here 
is Friedman’s (2014b) study of sectoral bargaining in Rui’an eyeglass cluster in Zhejiang 
Province, where workers interviewed indeed knew nothing about the industry level 
contract that covered them. Probably the best-known case of failure of enforcement of 
collective bargaining can be found in Wuhan, where the local government, in a top-down 
process initiated sectoral negotiations in 2011 in the restaurant industry. Although the 
sectoral contract has set wage terms for over 450,000 workers from 40,000 different 
establishments in 2011 (Xie & Guo, 2011), and has been renegotiated successfully over 
the last three years which has been well covered by mass media, recent research (Xie, 
Chen, Chen, & Xiao, 2012) shows that only 56.9% of employees surveyed were 
receiving the wages stipulated in the contract.  
Despite these issues, the ACFTU continues to focus on building collective 
bargaining institutions at the industry and regional levels. In Guangzhou, for instance, the 
official union has organized the construction industry, although no collective bargaining 
 32 
has been successfully achieved (Friedman, 2014b). In addition, union organizing by 
region has also been identified in areas with clusters of small businesses, such as 
community unions, village union associations, market unions, office building unions, and 
union associations by ownership in development zones (Liu, 2010). But we are skeptical 
of the prospects for institutionalization of collective bargaining at the regional level, 
given the heterogeneity in industries and firms in a region, and given that often workers 
are not aware of the agreement nor do they elect their representatives.  
 
 Quadrant 4: Centralized, authentic collective bargaining. There are a few instances of 
centralized sectoral bargaining that qualify as authentic. Unlike the previous examples, 
where it was either the local government or the ACFTU that was the primary engine 
behind the development of collective bargaining, in the case of Wenling the employers 
were the ones who initiated the project. Wenling, a town in Zhejiang Province, contains a 
knitwear cluster with more than 130 firms employing about 12,000 workers in 2002. In 
this case, employers began spontaneous wage coordination, in an effort to deal with the 
rising turnover as a result of what was an acute labor shortage (Xu, 2005). They formed 
an employer association in 2000, and institutionalized wage coordination amongst 
themselves, although not all employers came on board. By 2003, the local government 
stepped in, establishing an industrial union, which ultimately signed an industry-wide 
agreement with the employer association (Wen & Lin, 2015). That contract has been 
renegotiated every year since, and is stable, although it overwhelmingly focuses on the 
piece rates and not other working conditions. Moreover, it is a clear case of relatively 
authentic collective bargaining arrangement, in terms of how well the contract is enforced. 
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The second author interviewed workers in the industry in 2013, and found that the piece-
rates that were used to pay them was higher than or equal to those stipulated in the 
contract.  
The Wenling model is being increasingly diffused to other areas. In all, 15 
industries – including the pump sector in a town named Zeguo (Liu, 2010) – have carried 
out similar bargaining by 2012, covering roughly 6,100 enterprises and 400,000 workers 
(Zhang & Shi, 2012). There are reports of cases developing in other textile and garment 
(Lüthje, Luo, & Zhang, 2013: 269) as well as other manufacturing clusters (Lee, 2011). 
The commonalities across these ‘successful cases’ is that they are negotiating about the 
piece rate at the industry level, and wage coordination was welcomed by small and 
medium-sized firms in order to reduce turnover in a labor shortage situation. Therefore, 
success seems to be in part determined by employer interest and readiness for collective 
bargaining as well.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Moving across Quadrants: The Future of Collective Bargaining and The Roles of 
Unions and Employers 
While the above taxonomy presents a static picture of the varieties of collective 
bargaining in China, it is important to incorporate a dynamic element, specifically, what 
makes it possible to move from inauthentic to more authentic collective bargaining and 
how might decentralized bargaining connect with more centralized structures to create 
more worker solidarity.  
Comment [ED4]: AU: Please confirm is 
this heading is appropriate here.  
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How might we expect movement from inauthentic to more authentic bargaining at 
the firm level (i.e., from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2)? Certainly, as discussed earlier, 
strikes could trigger such a movement. But there are other ways as well. One strategy 
recently adopted in Guangzhou and Shenzhen is the grassroots union election (namely 
direct election for grassroots trade union cadres [gonghui zhixuan]). When workers are 
able to elect their own representatives, rather than having union leaders decided by the 
regional official union or the enterprise, it builds the local unions’ autonomy and 
independence, and is one necessary step for the growth of authentic bargaining. This 
focus on direct election is growing. For instance, the Shenzhen Federation of Trade 
Unions announced in 2012 that 163 enterprises with more than 1,000 employees would 
all adopt direct election (Eastmoney, 2012). The second author’s interview with a key 
informant involved in Shenzhen’s union election revealed that approximately 1,000 out 
of the 30,000 enterprise unions in Shenzhen had ‘carried out or reached the level of direct 
union election (dadao zhixuan shuiping)’ by August 2011. In Guangzhou, Peng, & Du 
(2010) report that several hundred of the over 50,000 firm unions had been directly 
elected by 2010. The case of direct union elections in Omron (Shenzhen) has been 
documented in Wen (2013) and Hui & Chan’s (2014) work. Yet, we need more research 
to properly evaluate how these elections are conducted.  
Although the efficacy of direct union elections has been debated (some argue that 
these elections were manipulated by employers or local officials, others question the 
degree to which these will be institutionalized in today’s political climate in China, and 
some suggest that there is rising opposition to direct elections from both employers and 
the state [Chan, 2009; Howell, 2008; Wen, 2013], the available evidence [ Hui & Chan, 
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2014; Wen, 2013]) and more recent first hand evidence from our research in 
Guangzhou’s auto industry suggests that thus far, democratic union elections facilitates 
collective bargaining with real negotiation between workers and employers, including 
some conflictual negotiations, that result in real rather than formalistic outcomes, and 
hence, more authentic.  
Movement from Quadrant 3 to 4 (i.e., from less authentic to more authentic 
bargaining at the centralized level) appears possible when employers take the first step in 
coordinating through employer associations, and when the local government directly 
intervenes to create industry wide settlements, as suggested by the Wenling model. 
However, given the lack of a real connection between unions at this level and the workers 
they represent, and the heterogenous workplaces that make direct election of 
representatives more difficult, we are not convinced that such a movement is imminent. 
In addition, there are a number of implementation and enforcement failures such as in the 
case of the restaurant industry in Wuhan that suggest the difficulty of achieving 
meaningful collective bargaining coverage for an entire regional industry.  
There is some evidence of increased coordination between decentralized and 
centralized levels. Zhang (2014) finds evidence of links between industry wage structures 
and firm level bargaining in a circumstance when lead and supplier firms belonging to the 
same value chain in the local labor market are involved. This indicates some degree of 
dynamism, distinct from the mostly static picture implied by our classification. This 
movement of informal coordination appears similar to those practices in the West, 
especially in Europe, although perhaps it is at a more incipient stage here. As Chinese 
employers in a cluster or industry begin to build better institutional structures to facilitate 
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coordination, that will stimulate a similar movement amongst workers, and unions, and 
thereby promote industry wide bargaining as well as firm level bargaining. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we examine the growth of strikes and collective bargaining in China. Using 
McAdam’s political process model, we argued that Chinese workers are striking more, 
and proactively after 2008. The Chinese state has encouraged the growth of collective 
bargaining, although its motivations for doing so could be attributed to different interests, 
such as providing a mechanism to resolve labor conflict or to increase wages in its effort 
to ‘rebalance’ the economy, a necessary condition to avoid the middle income trap. We 
argued further, that we would expect to see considerable variation in collective 
bargaining based on the differential interests of central and local states, who are enjoying 
more autonomy than they did in the past. And our analysis of the official union (ACFTU) 
and the crises of identity and legitimacy that it faces led us to expect that collective 
bargaining will be predominantly inauthentic.  
The evidence largely supports our expectations. Chinese workers are clearly 
striking more after 2008, and the numbers of strikes from two different sets of data show 
steady increases. Collective bargaining has also grown sharply after 2008, but the key 
agent charged with the responsibility of increasing bargaining coverage (the ACFTU) 
tends to view it, generally, as a bureaucratic exercise. Hence our finding that much of the 
incipient collective bargaining in China hews to the inauthentic side of the continuum. 
We also find considerable variation however, in collective bargaining. This variation is 
attributable to the willingness of the state to allow experimentation and it would appear 
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that different industrial relations actors, i.e. local labor bureaucracies, local employers, 
and local unions exercise considerable freedom to develop particular structures.  
While our taxonomy presents a static picture of collective bargaining in China 
today, we also highlight how it may change in the future, under the present institutional 
structure. We have identified several conditions that are necessary for bargaining 
arrangements to move towards greater authenticity. Specifically, even though the Chinese 
state is unlikely to permit workers to affiliate with unions of their choice, reforms within 
the ACFTU that move it in the direction of increasing its representative function is one 
avenue for change. An amendment to the Guangdong Provincial Regulation on Collective 
Contracts for Enterprises, is, in our view, one pathway to more authentic bargaining. The 
regulation is detailed, covering not only the content and subject matter of collective 
bargaining, but includes extensive provisions regarding various aspects of collective 
negotiations. Most crucially, the regulation specifies clearly that ‘negotiation 
representatives of the employees of the firm must either be selected by the trade union or 
democratically elected by the staff and workers’ – the first time that democratic elections 
have been specified in any provincial legislation regarding collective bargaining. 
However, despite the growth and variation that we see, and despite the promise 
implicit in the Guangdong regulations, overall, our paper suggests that collective 
bargaining in China is at a very incipient stage. At this point in 2015, our initial analyses 
would suggest that the institution of collective bargaining in China is more effective at 
increasing wages thereby meeting the state’s interest in rebalancing the economy, and 
less effective in meeting the state’s alternative interest i.e., representing workers 
adequately so as to reduce industrial conflict.  
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Under what conditions could collective bargaining meet the state’s alternative 
interest? This requires that Chinese unions overcome their problems of identity and 
legitimacy. A necessary condition is that the state must be willing to provide the unions 
with more independence. What might bring this about? The state would be willing to do 
so if the legitimacy of the CCP is under threat. And that could happen if industrial 
conflict and labor exploitation continue to increase despite the new laws and union 
activity.  
However, recent decisions suggest that the state has elected to follow an 
alternative approach of improving bargaining effectiveness with more centralization, 
rather than providing local union autonomy. In 2014, the ACFTU introduced a new five 
year plan (2014–2018) to promote collective bargaining. Simultaneously, in order to 
improve collective bargaining effectiveness, the ACFTU has adopted new guidelines to 
its locals. These include the notion that 100% of the workers covered under CB should be 
aware of the bargaining, and have provided them with relatively centralized formats, that 
would permit aggregation of data on wages. More importantly, in May 2015, the central 
government and CCP released ‘Suggestions for Establishing Harmonious Labor 
Relations’ – the first time that harmonious labor relations was promoted at the central 
level in a special document. These actions suggest that the CCP has acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the current collective bargaining system (i.e. poor implementation, poor 
quality of agreements, and the ACFTUs general inability to represent workers), and the 
threat of continued industrial conflict to its own legitimacy, but is still leary of providing 
local unions and workers with more autonomy that might result in the successful 
institutionalization of bargaining. 
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How does the development of Chinese unions and collective bargaining 
institutions compare with other Asian nations? We might look to both Taiwan and South 
Korea for parallels. Japan however, is less comparable, because the post-war 
development of both unions and collective bargaining developed in tandem with 
democratization (Gould, 1984), and was led by employers, who introduced the famous 
pillars of lifetime employment, seniority based wages and enterprise unions, in search of 
labor stability (Hashimoto, 1991). In both Korea and Taiwan, however, the export 
oriented industrialization regimes adopted by authoritarian governments entailed a high 
degree of control of labor. Rather like China today, Taiwan's policies then, required the 
unions to be affiliated to one central federation (the Chinese Federation of Labor) which 
was controlled by the Kuomintang regime (Deyo, 1987). Korea adopted a similar 
approach with the creation of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions created by the 
government. However, in contrast to Taiwan (where the workforce was mostly composed 
of labor working in agriculture and small scale industries), Korea's labor movement, even 
under authoritarian governments, developed a stronger working class identity, Deyo 
(1987) and Chu (1998) argue, due to the tradition of nationalist mobilization against the 
Japanese occupation, large sized firms involved in heavy industries, and high industry 
concentration. Both countries democratized in the late 1980s. Given their historical 
weakness, the labor movement in Taiwan did not play a major role in the democratization 
processes, unlike the Korean labor movement which was a central player in the process in 
Korea. Consequently, post democratization, Korean unions aggressively demonstrated 
their power through waves of strikes (Chu, 1998) that resulted in the formal 
institutionalization of a new industrial relations regime along pluralist lines. Taiwan's 
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labor movement, given its historical weakness, did not assert themselves as strongly after 
democratization, although a new labor relations regime developed thereafter. Thus, 
although there was broad similarity in terms of state control of labor in Korea, Taiwan 
and China, that similarity ended in the 1980s upon democratization in Korea and Taiwan. 
The Chinese labor movement still remains under state control, and the future evolution of 
both labor unions and collective bargaining is, as we have argued earlier in this paper, 
dependent on CCP's strategies.  
Having developed a ‘baseline’ taxonomy of collective bargaining, how might 
future research advance our knowledge about collective bargaining in China? Most 
importantly, we need research (detailed case studies) on how collective bargaining is 
conducted in different parts of China. As Friedman and Kuruvilla (2014) have argued, 
there is much experimentation and decentralization, and more empirical evidence of these 
processes are clearly necessary in order to evaluate what works best, in which locations, 
and why? We specifically need more case studies of authentic bargaining. Second, we 
need analyses of collective bargaining contracts (on both a national and regional scale) in 
order to determine which are the key issues of contention between management and labor 
and how they are changing overtime. More research on the various experiments regarding 
union elections and the impact of these on bargaining processes and outcomes is a key 
need as well. Thus, there are plenty of opportunities for cutting edge research in 
collective bargaining in China and we hope that Chinese management scholars would 
answer this call for research into a crucial national human resource issue.  
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[1] There have been various administrative provisions for collective negotiations since 
1994, but legal backing was only granted via the Labor Contract Law beginning in 
January 2008.  
 
[2] According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the term ‘enterprises above 
designated size’ points to those industrial legal person enterprises whose yearly main 
business incomes equal to or are more than 5 million yuan (2009). 
 
[3] The political geography in China divides the country into three levels of 
bureaucracies below the national level, namely, the provincial level, the city/county level, 
and the township level. (Note that a village government is not an official bureaucracy, but 
a villagers’ self-management organization). However, as a legacy of the Kuomintang 
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Table 1. Strikes in China, 2008–August 2014 
 
Year Number of 
strikes 
Average number of 
strikes per month 
2008 47 4 
2009 32 3 
2010 88 7 
2011 233 19 
2012 393 33 




(Source: The 2008–2012 data about China are from China Strikes website, available from 
URL: https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/; The 2013 data about China are from China 
Labor Bulletin, available from URL: http://www.numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html )  
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 (Source: China Labor Bulletin, available from URL: 
http://www.numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html, and China Strikes, available from 
URL: https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/ ) 
 
 



























































































Table 2. Labor disputes in China (2000–2012, every alternative year) 
 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Annual Average 
Growth Rate 
Number of cases 
accepted 
 









8,247 11,024 19,241 13,977 21,880 9,314 7,252 -1.07% 
Number of 
workers involved 
in collective labor 
disputes 
 
259,445 374,956 477,992 348,714 502,713 211,755 231,894 -0.93% 
Number of cases 
settled 
 
130,688 178,744 258,678 310,780 622,719 634,041 643,292 14.20% 




41,877 50,925 83,400 104,435 221,284 250,131 302,552 17.91% 
Number of cases 
settled by 
arbitration lawsuit 




  77,342 70,840 130,321 237,283 163,997 212,937 10.66% 
(Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2013)
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Table 3. Growth of collective bargaining in China, 2005–2010 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Annual 










41,306 525,964 622,063 774,501 901,665 1,115,874 93.34% 




35,312,320 37,145,872 39,685,737 51,101,198 61,776,321 75,657,331 16.46% 






Table 4. Wage growth in China (2000–2013) 
 







2000 9,333 12.2% 11.3% 
2001 10,834 16.1% 15.3% 
2002 12,373 14.2% 15.4% 
2003 13,969 12.9% 11.9% 
2004 15,920 14.0% 10.3% 
2005 18,200 14.3% 12.5% 
2006 20,856 14.6% 12.9% 
2007 24,721 18.5% 13.4% 
2008 28,898 16.9% 10.7% 
2009 32,244 11.6% 12.6% 
2010 36,539 13.3% 9.8% 
2011 41,799 14.4% 8.6% 
2012 46,769 11.9% 9.0% 
2013 51,483 10.1% 7.3% 
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